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南海和平社区建设的概念与途径：
尊重历史与国际法
傅崐成 *
内容摘要：《联合国海洋法公约》（以下简称“《公约》”）对闭海或半闭海等封
闭型海域，作了良善的设计，要求周边各沿岸国“必须尽力”相互协调合作，以建
设一个和平的海洋社区。《公约》诸多条文对各国如何就海洋生物资源管理、海洋
环境保护与海洋科学研究进行合作也有比较明确的规定。但是由于一些国家对南
海地区的历史及国际法的理想性不够尊重，加上若干西方学者和专家过度自负的
老式欧洲中心主义思想，南海社区建设的现状并不很乐观。如何走出这个困局？
针对南海周边国家及域外相关国家应该采取的态度与措施，作者提出了具体而深
刻的教育与宣传建议。
关键词：《联合国海洋法公约》     半闭海      和平社区      《南海行为准则》
和平解决南海的纷争应该是南海周边国家共同的愿望。在此前提之下，除了
要排除诸多南海区域内外的负面因素，忽略那些执意制造纠纷的国家或团体之
外，我们这些南海周边国家还应该按照《联合国海洋法公约》（以下简称“《公约》”）
的设计，致力于建设一个长效有序的南海和平社区。毫无疑问，这应该是南海周
边各国要走的道路。
一、《公约》对半闭海和平社区的设计
南海是一个半闭海，四周由中国、越南、柬埔寨、泰国、马来西亚、新加坡、印
尼、文莱和菲律宾所包围，周边有台湾海峡、巴士海峡、巴林塘海峡、巴布延海峡、
民都洛海峡、巴拉巴克海峡、巽他海峡和马六甲海峡等 8 个对外连接的海峡，连接
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着太平洋、印度洋等开阔海域。1 这样的半闭海域形成了一个海水动力较低，循环
较慢，在环境上基本自成一格、相对敏感而脆弱的海域。2
对于这样的海域，《公约》一贯是给以特别关注的。例如，沿海国专属经济区
内的“冰封区域”，也是同样的环境敏感而相对脆弱的海域，《公约》第 234 条就
特别针对这样的水域，给予沿岸国家广泛的特别立法管理权限。3 而为了有效管理
和养护闭海或半闭海海洋生态环境，《公约》第 123 条作了一个可贵的设计，要求
周边国家必须就这种闭海或半闭海海洋生物资源的养护利用、海洋环境的保护及
海洋科学联合研究项目的推展，相互协调合作。其他利害相关的域外国家或国际
组织，只能够“在适当时候”“应邀”参与半闭海周边国家的“合作”。这一重要的
条文如下：
第 123 条  闭海或半闭海沿岸国的合作
闭海或半闭海沿岸国在行使和履行本公约所规定的权利和义务时 ,应该
（should）互相合作。为此目的 ,这些国家应尽力（shall endeavour）直接或
通过适当区域组织 :
(a) 协调海洋生物资源的管理、养护、勘探和开发；
(b) 协调行使和履行其在保护和保全海洋环境方面的权利和义务；
(c) 协调其科学研究政策 ,并在适当情形下在该地区进行联合的科学研究
方案；
(d) 在适当情形下 ,邀请其他有关国家或国际组织与其合作以推行本条的
规定。
这一条文强调闭海与半闭海周边国家在实践其公约权利、履行其公约义务
时，需要“互相合作”。但是这样的规范只是一种宣示性质的规范，并无强制性。
因为条文的用语是“应该”（should），而非“应”(shall) 互相合作。此外，关于各
国在海洋生物资源、海洋环境保护与海洋科研领域内的“相互协调”，《公约》条
1       中国人民解放军海军司令部航海保证部：《中国航路指南：南海海区》，天津：中国航海
图书出版社 2006 年版，第 3~4 页。其中提及南海有 10 个海峡 , 除上述 8 个连接外部
开阔水域者外，还有琼州海峡及新加坡海峡两个南海内部的海峡。
2　   John F. Caddy, Toward a Comparative Evaluation of Human Impacts on Fishery Ecosystems 
of Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas, Reviews in Fisheries Science, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 1993, 
pp. 57~95. 此外，以黑海这一半闭海为例证，可参见 Yuriy Tokarev and Georgiy 
Shulman, Biodiversity in the Black Sea: Effects of Climate and Anthropogenic Factors, 
Hydrobiologia, Vol. 580, Issue 1, 2007, pp. 23~33.
3　    第 234 条“冰封区域”规定：沿海国有权制定和执行非歧视性的法律和规章，以防止、
减少和控制船只在专属经济区范围内冰封区域对海洋的污染，这种区域内的特别严寒
气候和一年中大部分时候冰封的情形对航行造成障碍或特别危险，而且海洋环境污染
可能对生态平衡造成重大的损害或无可挽救的扰乱。这种法律和规章应适当顾及航
行和以现有最可靠的科学证据为基础对海洋环境的保护和保全。
南海和平社区建设的概念与途径 : 尊重历史与国际法 3
文的用语也只是“应尽力”（shall endeavour），仍然不是“应”（shall）。从法律
文义解释的角度来看，这只是“必须尽力”即可，同样没有任何强制性。
其次，第 123 条中关于社区内沿海国与域外国家或国际组织合作推行本条规
定的规范条文文字，包含了下列5个要点：（1）只是“必须尽力”为之，没有强制性；
（2）可以直接或通过适当的区域组织（例如东盟）为之；（3）在适当的情况下为之；
（4）邀请为之，不是不请自来的合作；（5）受邀请的应该是“有关的”( 即利害相
关的 ) 国家或国际组织。
在第三届联合国海洋法会议谈判本条文时，土耳其和乌拉圭曾经分别提案，
要求规范闭海或半闭海沿岸国家的领海宽度，必须由相关邻国相互协商，以“协议”
的方式来决定，不宜按照一般的距离规定来决定。4 伊拉克曾经提案要求确保半闭
海中的航行自由。5 南斯拉夫也曾提案，主张规定半闭海连接外海的出口必须保持
航行自由与飞越自由 , 但其提议并不影响用于国际航行的海峡的通行制度。6 除了
这些提案之外，在会议过程中，很多国家都提出了一些对闭海或半闭海规范的意
见。其中韩国曾经提案，要求把条文草案中的“应该”（should）改为“应”(shall)，
以创造一定的法律义务。但是这一意见也没有被接受。7
从上述国际立法会议的经过，以及最终完成的《公约》第 123 条的条文文义
来看，虽然没有创设出任何强制规范，但是，类似于南海、黑海、加勒比海这样的
闭海或半闭海的沿岸国家需要相互协调合作，特别是在海洋生物资源、海洋环境
保护与海洋科学研究事务上，“必须尽力”推行协调，取得合作。这样的规定已经
足以说明，每一个闭海或半闭海区域，毫无疑问就是《公约》设计的一个社区。而
中国作为南海周边人口最多、经济总量最大的沿岸国家，自然应该是南海社区最
主要的成员，需要考虑并且引领各国解决在建设南海社区过程中出现的种种问题。
二、《公约》对三大合作领域的规范
4  　 A/AC.138/SC.II/L.16, paragraph 2, reproduced in III SBC Report 1973, p. 2 (Turkey); A/
AC.138/SC.II/ L.16/Rev.1, paragraph 2, reproduced in III SBC Report 1973, p. 2 (Turkey); 
A/AC.138/SC.II/L.24, article 2, paragraph 2, reproduced in III SBC Report 1973, pp. 23, 25 
(Uruguay), quoted in Myron H. Nordquist et al. ed., United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. III, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 
357.
5  　 A/CONF.62/C.2/L.71 and Add. 1 and 2 (1974), articles 1 to 4, III Off. Rec. 236 (Iraq), 
quoted in Myron H. Nordquist et al. ed., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982: A Commentary, Vol. III, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 358.
6　   Yugoslavia (1976, mimeo.), article 129 bis (RSNT II), reproduced in IV Platzoder 486, 
quoted in Myron H. Nordquist et al. ed., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982: A Commentary, Vol. III, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p 361. 
7　   C.2/Informal Meeting/59 (1980, mimeo.), article 123 (Korea), reproduced in V Platzoder 
63, quoted in Myron H. Nordquist et al. ed., United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. III, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 365.
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需要注意的是，《公约》第 123 条规定的只是南海这样的半闭海的周边国家
应该“在行使和履行本公约所规定的权利和义务时”“互相合作”。至于“为此目的”
各沿海国“必须尽力”相互协调的海洋生物资源养护管理、海洋环境保护、海洋科
学研究三个合作领域的规范，还必须从《公约》其他条文中寻找。
第一，关于海洋生物资源养护管理方面。
《公约》第 56 条 1 款 a 项中有关各国在其专属经济区内探勘、开发、利用天
然资源方面享有主权性权利的规定，当然也是半闭海沿岸国家重要的基本规范。
《公约》第 61 条关于生物资源养护的规定，包括采取适当的养护与管理措施以避
免过度开发利用，同时与国际组织合作推进这些措施的规范，都是像南海这样的
半闭海的周边国家必须践行的规范。《公约》第 63 条针对出现在两个或两个以上
沿海国专属经济区的种群，或出现在专属经济区内又出现在专属经济区外的邻接
区域内的种群作出规范。这对南海半闭海的生物资源管理更加重要。
《公约》第 117 条和第 118 条要求所有国家合作养护管理公海生物资源。这
一规范对南海仍然有适用的机会，因为即便在这一狭窄的半闭海内，也仍然可能
存在一小块超出各国专属经济区外部界限的海域，必须适用 1982 年《公约》所制
定的公海规则。8 
第二，关于海洋环境保护方面。
《公约》第 56 条 1 款 b 项之 (3) 明文规定，沿海国对专属经济区的海洋环境
保护事项享有管辖权。除此之外，《公约》第 192 条还整体性地规定了各国有保
护和保全海洋环境的义务。此一条文必须与第193条同时阅读。后者明文规定：“各
国有依据其环境政策和按照其保护和保全海洋环境的职责开发其自然资源的主权
权利。” 《公约》第 195 条为防止污染转移，进一步规定：“各国在采取措施防止、
减少和控制海洋环境的污染时采取的行动不应直接或间接将损害或危险从一个区
域转移到另一个区域，或将一种污染转变成另一种污染。”这对闭海或半闭海周边
的邻近国家如何处理污染转移，显然更加有意义。最后，第197 条则明文规定：“各
国在为保护和保全海洋环境而拟订和制订符合本公约的国际规则、标准和建议的
办法及程序时，应在全球性的基础上或在区域性的基础上，直接或通过主管国际
组织进行合作，同时考虑到区域的特点。”这就进一步限定了像南海这样的半闭海
的周边国家，在建构区域海洋环保制度时，必须与相关的国际组织合作，并关注南
海社区本身的特性。
当然，关于海洋环保，在《公约》之外，联合国环境规划署的区域海洋项目也
已经为地中海、红海、亚丁湾、大加勒比海等区域海洋（主要为半闭海）量身打造
了一系列的海洋环境保护公约。除了联合国环境规划署打造的这些公约，波罗的
8 　 尽管目前相关的南海若干岛礁的基点基线尚未明确，但是这一小块可能存在的公海区
域大概会出现在南海北部比较宽广的部分，即东沙群岛的南方附近海域。
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海、黑海等半闭海区域的周边国家也已经制定了各自社区内的相关公约。
第三，关于海洋科学研究方面。
《公约》第 56 条 1 款 b 项之 (2) 明文规定，各国对其专属经济区内的海洋科
学研究事项享有管辖权。另外，《公约》第 87 条 1 款 f 项也明确了各国在公海享
有科学研究的自由。第 245 条规定了沿海国在其领海内对海洋科学研究的主权行
使原则：“沿海国在行使其主权时 , 有规定、准许和进行其领海内的海洋科学研究
的专属权利。领海内的海洋科学研究 , 应经沿海国明示同意并在沿海国规定的条
件下才可进行。”第 246 条则详细规范了各沿海国对其专属经济区和大陆架范围
内的海洋科学研究的管理原则，如何合理地行使同意权，以及如何拒绝同意外国
的科学研究请求。9
必须强调的是，以上这些规范的实践，都必须在《公约》前言第4段所倡导的“和
平用途”之下进行。该段文字如下：
 
[本公约缔约各国 ]认识到有需要通过本公约 ,在妥为顾及所有国家主权
的情形下 ,为海洋建立一种法律秩序 ,以便利国际交通和促进海洋的“和平用
途”,海洋资源的公平而有效的利用 ,海洋生物资源的养护以及研究、保护和
保全海洋环境……
9　   第 246 条“专属经济区内和大陆架上的海洋科学研究”：
1. 沿海国在行使其管辖权时 , 有权按照本公约的有关条款 , 规定、准许和进行在其专
属经济区内或大陆架上的海洋科学研究。
2. 在专属经济区内和大陆架上进行海洋科学研究 , 应经沿海国同意。
3. 在正常情形下 , 沿海国应对其他国家或各主管国际组织按照本公约专为和平目的和
为了增进关于海洋环境的科学知识以谋全人类利益 , 而在其专属经济区内或大陆架上
进行的海洋科学研究计划 , 给予同意。为此目的 , 沿海国应制订规则和程序 , 确保不
致不合理地推迟或拒绝给予同意。
4. 为适用第 3 款的目的 , 尽管沿海国和研究国之间没有外交关系 , 它们之间仍可存在
正常情况。
5. 但沿海国可斟酌决定 , 拒不同意另一国家或主管国际组织在该沿海国专属经济区内
或大陆架上进行海洋科学研究计划 , 如果该计划 : 
(a) 与生物或非生物自然资源的勘探和开发有直接关系 ;
(b) 涉及大陆架的钻探、炸药的使用或将有害物质引入海洋环境 ;
(c) 涉及第六十和第八十条所指的人工岛屿、设施和结构的建造、操作或使用 ;
(d) 含有依据第二四八条提出的关于该计划的性质和目标的不正确情报 , 或如进行研
究的国家或主管国际组织由于先前进行研究计划而对沿海国负有尚未履行的义务。
6. 虽有第 5 款的规定 , 如果沿海国已在任何时候公开指定从测算领海宽度的基线量起
二百海里以外的某些特定区域为已在进行或将在合理期间内进行开发或详探作业的
重点区域 , 则沿海国对于在这些特定区域之的大陆架上按照本部分规定进行的海洋科
学研究计划 , 即不得行使该款 (a) 项规定的斟酌决定权而拒不同意。沿海国对于这类
区域的指定及其任何更改 , 应提出合理的通知 , 但无须提供其中作业的详情。
7. 第 6 款的规定不影响第七十七条所规定的沿海国对大陆架的权利。
8. 本条所指的海洋科学研究活动 , 不应对沿海国行使本公约所规定的主权权利和管辖
权所进行的活动有不当的干扰。
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可见整部《公约》的精神就是要为人类在海洋资源利用、海洋环境保护与相关
的科学研究活动上建立一个和平的大环境。事实上，不仅在《公约》的序言中有
对此精神的表彰，在《公约》第 88（关于“公海”）、141、143、147、155（关于“国
际海底区域”）、240、242、246（关于“海洋科学研究”）条的细节规范中，也都强
调一切必须是“为和平的目的”进行的。因此，对于南海这样的半闭海而言，整个
公约的设计就是在强调和平合作、相互协调，以维护一个周边国家共治共享的和
平海洋社区。
三、对历史的不了解或不尊重
然而，尽管国际法已经赋予各国建设和平社区的法律依据，在南海建设一个
和平社区的现实却一直不太乐观。这其中的障碍主要源于一些国家不够了解历史
及历史权利，或虽然了解，却不予尊重。
中国对南海岛礁的主权，是源自历史上“先占”所取得的原始权利。早在东汉
（公元 25—220 年），《异物志》中就已经有了明白的记述。10 1933 年法国强行
登陆中国南海的西沙、南沙数个小岛，在战乱中的中国政府与人民仍然坚持不断
抗议、交涉。11 在短短 6 年之后的 1939 年，日本以武力吞并了南海多个小岛，结
束了法国的占领行为，日本的侵占一直持续到二战结束。12 相对于这些凭武力短
暂占领的殖民主义者，中国政府与人民先发现、先使用、先管领南海诸岛礁的历史，
长逾千年，证据多如牛毛。13 其详并非本文所要讨论的主题，此处暂且不表。
10  （东汉）杨孚撰《异物志》记载了当时航行于西沙、南沙的危险，称：“涨海崎头，水浅
而多磁石，檄外大舟，锢以铁叶，值之多拔。”参见（明）唐胄撰《正德琼台志》，卷九，
土产下，药之属，引《异物志》，第 14 页，上海古籍书店据宁波天一阁藏明正德残本
影印，1964 年版。转引自韩振华主编，《我国南海诸岛史料汇编》，北京：东方出版社
1988 年版，第 23 页。
11    中国政府与人民在此期间不断向法国政府抗议、交涉，而法国也从未实质管领这些小
岛。不仅如此，1933 年 11 月、12 月出版的法国杂志《Terre Air Mer, La Geographie》
刊有法人 Oliver A. Saix 所撰《西沙群岛》一文，文中提及 20 世纪 20 年代法国驻越南
代理总督曾承认：“根据多方报道，西沙群岛为中国所有。”同一时期，一法国船长也
承认：“时至今日，安南与西沙群岛可谓已一无关系。沿岸渔人或船主无人前去，且
不知有此群岛矣。”参见丘宏达：《西沙、南沙群岛的领土主权问题》，载于《人与社会》
1974 年第 3 期，第 39 页，注 48。
12　  1939 年（日本昭和 14 年）日本驻台湾的总督府发布《台湾总督令第三十一号》称：
“新南群岛（日本为西沙、南沙所取的新名称）已并入台湾府高雄州高雄市辖内。”
该命令复刊于 1939 年 4 月 18 日台北总督府出版的官报，第 3683 号，第 720 页。
Hungdah Chiu and Choon-ho Park, Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, Ocean 
Development and International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1975, p. 13.
13　傅崐成，《南（中国）海法律地位之研究》，台北：123 资讯有限公司 1995 年版，第
47~116 页；傅崐成，《南海的主权与矿藏——历史与法律》，台北：幼狮文化事业公司
1981 年版，第 77~108 页。
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但是一些不明就里的西方学者却在对中国古老历史无知的情况下，武断地将
中国对南海岛礁的主权主张，和后来法国、日本这样的殖民主义者的军事占有行
为相提并论；而且还错误地宣称，这些远从域外来到南海的武力殖民主义者享有更
明确的权利证据。在 2016 年中菲南海仲裁案中，按照菲律宾律师的说辞，仲裁员
们居然写下了这样的句子：14
按照菲律宾的说法，从仲裁庭取自法国国家图书馆及国家远洋档案馆并
提交给菲律宾评论的各项历史文献来看，中国在南海没有任何历史权利也
是很明显的。依照菲律宾的见解，这些文献确认“在二战之前，法国并不认
为，中国曾对南沙群岛的任何岛屿或远离中国海岸的南海水域提出过任何主
张。”15 
此外，仲裁员们还写到：
“战后的文献——包括法国的内部文献——明确显示法国保有它对那些
岛礁的主张”，这一立场也与菲律宾认定英国与美国依照《开罗宣言》及《波
茨坦公告》“希望保护法国主权主张”的看法一致。16
这些说辞竟然被写入中菲南海仲裁案的裁决书，这所显示的是长久以来一些
心中仍然充斥着欧洲中心主义思想的西方学者或政治人物一厢情愿的想法：“中
国不能是南海诸群岛的主人。”他们“希望”南海诸岛是欧洲的法国、英国甚至德
国的领土，而千百年来在此地生活的中国人民，是可以被完全忽略不顾的。仲裁
员们也在裁决过程中表现出这样不当的心理。但是，足以令他们失望的是，历史
的事实正好与他们的希望相反。中国不但对这些南海岛礁有着因千百年来最先发
现、使用、管领而先占取得的原始主权，而且还对这些岛礁附近的南海水域享有国
际法上合法的历史性权利。
仲裁裁决书中提到的《开罗宣言》和《波茨坦公告》这些二战文件，非但没有
支持法国殖民主义者继续享有南海岛礁主权的意思，还在其谈判过程中显示出同
盟国家希望在战后彻底废除殖民主义的理念。值得一提的是，当时战争的主要领
导者美国的立场，与逐渐“日落”的大英帝国的想法完全不同。与丘吉尔、蒋介石
14　 South China Sea Arbitration, Award on Merits, 12 July 2016, para. 198.
15　 South China Sea Arbitration, Written Responses of the Philippines on French Archive 
Materials, 3 June 2016, para. 30. 显然，远在欧洲的法国殖民时代政府对于远东岛屿领
土的主权主张，根本不应该被认为具有任何决定性。所谓的菲律宾的说法完全只是当
事方的片面希望。 
16　 South China Sea Arbitration, Written Responses of the Philippines on French Archive 
Materials, 3 June 2016, para. 31.
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一同谈判达成《开罗宣言》的罗斯福总统曾在奥古斯塔军舰上与丘吉尔讨论战后
殖民地是否应存在的问题。罗斯福认为，这是 18 世纪的构造，对殖民地的人民毫
不公平，战后应予以改变。丘吉尔则只能在感受到战争领导权转移时，气急败坏
地摇晃着一根手指头，对罗斯福说：“我知道战后阁下必弃大英帝国于不顾。你所
提出的每一个想法都说明了这点。虽然如此，我们知道美国仍然是我们唯一的希
望。你我皆知，没有美国的援助，大英帝国也不能存在。”17 当时的苏联领导人斯
大林更是明白表示反对战后把安南（越南旧称）交还给法国。18
从历史后续发展的事实来看，二战之后，同盟国家立刻推动成立了联合国，并
把“废除殖民主义”当作人类共同的使命，设立了托管理事会，继续推进世界各地
旧殖民地的自决行动。19 
事实上，在 1943 年开罗会议的高峰会谈中，蒋介石也曾与英美领袖达成协
议：（1）朝鲜应于相当期限内独立；（2）越南应独立，不能再交由法国管理；（3）
琉球暂由中美共管。可惜，由于高峰会谈的内容没有记录，结果只有关于朝鲜独
立的协议部分实现；琉球和越南独立的诺言都没能得到遵守。后来引发的琉球问
题与越南战争，诚令人浩叹，应为世界各国引为殷鉴。20
事实上，当时的法国已经只剩下一个空洞的流亡政府。所谓“英国与美国希
望保护法国的主权主张”，最多只是同盟国家（包括中国）一致希望战后重建独立
的法国，并不是支持法国的越南殖民地权利。即便有任何支持法国殖民地权利的
想法，恐怕也只是丘吉尔个人的想法。事实证明，战后同盟国建立的联合国体制，
自始坚持废除殖民主义。即便在二战尚未结束的时候，美英两国对殖民地、殖民
主义的看法也明显不同。但放弃 18 世纪的殖民地体制，协助非自我统治的殖民地
人民自由决定其前途，创造公平、自由的国际贸易体制，已经毫无疑问地成为全世
17　 Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It, New York: Duel Sloane & Pearce, 1946, pp. 36~42.
18　 中国驻俄大使傅秉常于 1943 年 12 月 11 日电告国民政府：对于《开罗宣言》的内容，
斯大林表示完全同意。傅秉常大使来电称，哈里曼密告——苏联还表示，战后不应把
安南交还给法国。参见：台湾领导人幕僚机构档案，《开罗会议日志》，第 159~160 页。
转引自梁敬錞：《开罗会议》，台北：台湾商务印书馆 1978 年第 4 版，第 156 页。
19　 1942 年 1 月 1 日，美、英、中、苏等 26 个反法西斯国家签署了《联合国家共同宣言》，
共同主张建立一个新的普遍性的国际组织。1945 年二战结束，由美、英、中、苏、法 5
国正式发起并邀请《联合国家共同宣言》各签字国参加的联合国制宪大会于 1945 年 4
月 25 日在美国旧金山举行。来自 50 个国家的 280 多名代表和 1700 多名顾问、专家
与媒体记者出席了大会。中国代表团由 10 人组成。会议以敦巴顿橡胶园会议的建议
为基础，经过两个多月的讨论，起草了《联合国宪章》。同年 6 月 25 日，代表们一致
通过了此宪章。翌日，与会代表一一在宪章上签字。按照大会商定的程序，中国代表
董必武第一个用毛笔在宪章上写下了自己的名字。各国代表陆续签署了宪章之后，
波兰代表也在宪章上补签。签署宪章的 51 个国家成为联合国的创始会员国。同年 10
月 24 日，美、英、中、苏、法等多数签字国送交了批准书，宪章开始生效，联合国正式
宣告成立。宪章规定，联合国的宗旨为“维护国际和平与安全”“发展国际间以尊重
人民平等权利及自决原则为基础的友好关系”和“进行国际合作”。废除殖民主义已
成为世界各国一致的愿望。
20　 梁敬錞：《开罗会议》，台北：台湾商务印书馆 1978 年第 4 版，第 157~159 页。
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界人民一致的愿望。那些还对殖民地权利痴心妄想的人士，应该看清国际法的发
展历史，放弃与世界人民为敌的欲望。
值得顺带注意的是，当年英美两国基于自身的利益考虑，在对中国战区的战
后处理上，意见也不相同，并且没有和中国的领导人充分商量。21 美军战史的研究
报告认为，二战末期，在开罗会议、德黑兰会议中，英美对中国战区意见的不一致，
影响了远东的战后局势。22 这一历史因素造成当今远东地区国际法律立场的紊乱，
例如琉球的地位、钓鱼岛的纠纷和南海岛礁的主权争议，对该地区的和平稳定造
成长期不利的影响。这些史实特别值得曾经遭受西方国家殖民统治的南海周边国
家（包括中国、越南与菲律宾）深刻反思，吸取教训，并引为殷鉴——南海周边国
家想要获得长久的和平发展环境，显然不能依靠域外大国的决策，而必须依靠我
们南海社区内成员的善意与合作。
如今，虽然《公约》对南海社区的法律设计清楚无疑，但我们社区内部成员本
身的善意与合作仍然不足。这就形成了南海和平社区建设的障碍。
事实上，对于中国在南海源自先占取得的领土主权主张，菲律宾与越南其
实是非常明白的。中国 1945 年在南海进行了战后收复西沙、南沙的行动，并于
1947 年正式划定了南海海域的 U 形断续海疆线。菲律宾与越南这两个目前侵占
着南沙若干岛礁的国家，当时并没有任何异议。1956年菲律宾克洛玛兄弟宣称“发
现”南沙“无主地”的闹剧，早已被中外学者专家所驳斥。23 1958 年北越总理范文
同致中国总理周恩来的官式照会，更能说明历史的真相。1958 年 9 月 4 日，中国
宣布《关于领海的声明》，将领海扩充为 12 海里，并主张以直线基线法来划定领
海范围。声明中同时宣称，上述规定也同时适用于西沙群岛、南沙群岛和其他属
21　 事实上，开罗会议召开之际，中国的对日战争已经进行了 6 年，而英美在对日战略上
尚未达成共识。在此前后，中国战区受美国“先欧后亚”政策的影响，《马歇尔报告》
显示，直到二战结束，中国租借的物资最少，仅及美国对外租借物资的 5%，且常常被
临时挪作他用。联军中国战区的统帅未能参加联军对日战略的讨论。丘吉尔一心只
想维护大英帝国在远东的殖民地利益。中国军队运抵仰光的物资曾被英军抢走。中
国军队与英军在平满纳联合作战时，中军担任正面作战，而担任右翼的英军，却在战
事最激烈时悄悄撤退，给中国军队造成重大损失。在仁安羌作战时，中方因调集劲旅
解救被围英军 7000 余人，战线为敌所破而败退。迄今美英两国鲜少公开讲述中国在
二战期间的牺牲奉献，其心虚可见一二。参见梁敬錞：《开罗会议》，台北：台湾商务
印书馆 1978 年第 4 版，第 12~14 页。此外，可参见《抗日战史》，第 249 页，《远征军
入缅作战》（上卷），第 4~5 页。均转引自梁敬錞：《开罗会议》，台北：台湾商务印书
馆 1978 年第 4 版，第 33 页。
22　  Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-44, Appendix B. 转引自梁敬錞：《开罗会
议》，台北：台湾商务印书馆 1978 年第 4 版，第 40 页。
23　 Hungdah Chiu and Choon-ho Park, Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, Ocean 
Development and International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1975, p. 9 ；《中国南海诸岛地志》，
1975 年 6 月 30 日，第 13 页；《海军巡弋南沙海疆经过》，台北：台湾学生书局 1984
年 6 月版，第 85~89 页；《克洛马事件处置报告书》，1956 年 10 月，收录于傅崐成、
刘莉、景孝杰编：《中国台湾当局南疆史料展（CD）》，厦门：厦门大学南海研究院，
2015 年 3 月 1 日。 
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于中国之岛屿。24 同年 9 月 14 日，北越总理范文同以正式照会向中国总理周恩来
表示：“越南民主共和国政府承认和赞同中华人民共和国政府 1958 年 9 月 4 日关
于领海决定的声明。越南民主共和国政府尊重这项决定。”25
四、从《南海各方行为宣言》到《南海行为准则》
在今天的南海，特别是被菲、越、马等国分别窃占数岛礁的南沙群岛，混乱的
局面一时还难以解决。主要的原因并非法律规定不清楚，而是一些域内、域外国
家不尊重历史与法律。所幸中国坚持走和平发展的道路，南海迄今没有发生重大
的战乱。多年来，在中国的努力推动下，南海地区已经有了 2002 年 11 月 4 日在
柬埔寨首都金边签订的《南海各方行为宣言》，其宗旨在于叫停这个社区内无序的
岛礁侵占行为与掠夺性的资源开发活动。此外，中国也已经于 2004 年与越南在
南海北部湾海域完成了海上划界行动。但是，一些南海周边国家的学者、官员，仍
在部分西方学者的煽动之下，宣称《南海各方行为宣言》并非条约，没有任何拘束
力。部分国家不时企图超越《南海各方行为宣言》，继续私自开采油气资源，也没
有将窃占的岛礁返还中国的意愿。在此情况下，中国一方面坚持遵守《南海各方
行为宣言》，一方面也愿意按照《南海各方行为宣言》第 10 条的规划，与南海社区
成员国家，共同研定更具有完整规范效力的《南海行为准则》，以期早日完成本地
区长期有效的和平社区建设。26
如何顺利完成《南海行为准则》谈判，以成就“另一个”有约束力的条约？中
国外交部长王毅曾经在 2013 年 8 月 5 日向媒体记者提出了 4 个重点：27
1. 要对《南海行为准则》的谈判抱持合理的期待。这样重大的谈判不可能在
一夕之间完成。
2. 谈判应达成全体一致的意见。这也是我们在 2002 年完成《南海各方行为
宣言》时的协议。为求将来能够成功地实践《南海行为准则》，有必要以全体一致
同意的方式来完成《南海行为准则》的谈判。
3.要排除干扰。《南海各方行为宣言》各方须为此目标，携手同行，共同努力，
避免干扰。
4. 我们需要按部就班地进行。现有的《南海各方行为宣言》不能被《南海行为
24　 Hungdah Chiu and Choon-ho Park, Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, Ocean 
Development and International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1975, p. 15, footnote 80.
25　 中国外交部于 1980 年 1 月 30 日公布文件《中国对西沙群岛和南沙群岛的主权无可争
辩》，载于《大公报》，1980 年 1 月 31 日。
26  《南海各方行为宣言》第十条：有关各方重申制定《南海行为准则》将进一步促进本地
区和平与稳定，并同意在各方协商一致的基础上，朝最终达成该目标而努力。
27　 下载于 http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-08-05/133327867046.shtml，2018 年 11 月 9 日。
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准则》所取代。各方并非要放弃原有的《南海各方行为宣言》去创造一个全新的事
物。《南海行为准则》是建立在《南海各方行为宣言》的基础上的。
2017 年中国已经与东盟国家一同起草了《南海行为准则》的内容纲要。但是
其内容细节并没有被公布。显然大家对其最终内容还有一定程度的保留。笔者认
为，王毅部长提出的 4 点基本原则，特别是第 3 点和第 4 点，理应得到南海周边国
家的一致认同。这应该是未来建立南海和平社区的基石。因为这彰显了对国际条
约法的基本尊重，也是我们这个社区的成员相互信赖、共秉社区共赢信念的基础。
五、社区内外的努力途径
总之，在现在不完美的情况下，我们应该如何合作推进南海社区概念的建设？
如何创建一个和平、合作、协调、进步的南海社区呢？笔者认为应该可以从社区内
外两方面的教育宣传着手。
首先，就南海周边沿海国家而言，教育宣传的重点在于：
1. 共同提倡民族平等、和平共处，坚决否定旧式的欧洲中心主义；
2. 遵守《公约》，促进南海半闭海和平社区的建设，弘扬社区服务精神；
3. 珍惜这个社区的历史与爱好和平的社区文化传统；
4. 推动国际社会的法治，尊重国际法的“应然”，不要为了短暂的现实利益而
牺牲国际法的理想性；
5. 从南海社区低敏感度的项目开始合作，例如：共同禁渔、限渔、合作养护环
境生态、加强建设航行安全设施与紧急搜救等项目。
其次，针对利害相关的域外国家，教育宣传的重点在于：
1. 尊重南海周边国家解决本社区纠纷的能力，停止未受到社区邀请的主动干
预；
2. 虚心了解并尊重南海地区各民族的悠久历史与爱好和平的文化传统；
3. 诚恳地遵守《公约》有关半闭海社区的规范，停止对本社区的不当介入；
4. 承认并且尊重南海千百年来和平、自由航行的事实，停止造谣生事，以维护
航行自由为借口插手南海社区的事务。
                                                                                                             责任编辑：林凤来
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To Build a Peaceful Community in the 
South China Sea: Concept and Approaches
FU Kuen-chen*
Abstract: Article 123 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea requires littoral States of semi-enclosed seas such as the South China Sea 
to endeavor to coordinate and cooperate in regional marine living resources 
management, marine environmental protection and marine scientific research 
projects. A sense of community for such a semi-enclosed sea will certainly benefit 
the region and even the world. However, due to ignorance of or a lack of respect 
for the local history, and the “ought-to-be” of contemporary international law, the 
idea of constructing a peaceful community in the South China Sea is still facing 
difficulties. The author suggests that the South China Sea littoral States establish 
self-confidence and endeavor to initiate regional community construction works 
with the aim of ensuring a peaceful community. States beyond the region should 
learn and respect the thousand years long history and traditional culture in the 
region, including the everlasting tradition of peaceful and free navigation, and 
should stop any self-designated interventions in the affairs of the local community.
Key Words: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; Semi-
enclosed sea; Peaceful community; Code of Conduct in the South China Sea
All the States bordering the South China Sea (SCS) should aspire to settle 
their disputes in the region through peaceful means. In that case, in addition to 
mitigating and eradicating internal and external factors that have adverse impacts 
on the SCS region and ignoring those States or organizations that willfully stir up 
disputes in the region, the SCS littoral States should also be, in accordance with 
* 　 FU Kuen-chen, professor and dean of Xiamen University South China Sea Institute. E-mail: 
kuenchen_fu@163.com. This paper is a research result of the special research project on the 
protection of China’s maritime rights and interests sponsored by the National Social Science 
Fund of China (No. 17VHQ012). 
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the concepts envisaged by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), committed to building a long-term, orderly and peaceful community in 
the South China Sea. This, undoubtedly, should be the path that SCS littoral States 
have to follow. 
I. The Concept of Peaceful Communities Bordering Semi-
Enclosed Seas under the UNCLOS
The SCS is a semi-enclosed sea surrounded by China, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines. Eight 
straits or channels, including the Taiwan Strait, the Bashi Channel, the Balintang 
Channel, the Barbuyan Channel, the Mindoro Strait, the Balabac Strait, the Sunda 
Strait and the Strait of Malacca, connect the SCS with the open seas of the Pacific 
and the Indian Oceans.1 Such a semi-enclosed sea constitutes a relatively sensitive 
and fragile marine area, which has low seawater dynamics, slow circulation and 
basically a self-contained environment.2
The UNCLOS has paid particular regard to such marine areas with special 
conditions. For example, the “ice-covered areas” lying within the limits of the 
exclusive economic zone of a coastal State are also environmentally sensitive and 
fragile. UNCLOS Article 234 granted the coastal State an extensive and special 
legislative authority with regard to such waters in particular.3 Article 123 provides 
1  　 Navigation Guarantee Department of the Chinese Navy Headquarters, Guide on Chinese 
Sea Routes: the South China Sea Area, Tianjin: China Navigation Publications Press, 2006, 
pp. 3~4 (in Chinese). The Guide says that the South China Sea (SCS) encompasses ten 
straits or channels. In addition to the eight ones connecting the SCS with the pen seas, it 
also has two internal ones, namely Qiongzhou Strait and Singapore Strait. 
2  　 John F. Caddy, Toward a Comparative Evaluation of Human Impacts on Fishery Ecosystems 
of Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas, Reviews in Fisheries Science, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 1993, 
pp. 57~95. For the example of the semi-enclosed sea– the Black Sea, please see Yuriy 
Tokarev and Georgiy Shulman, Biodiversity in the Black Sea: Effects of Climate and 
Anthropogenic Factors, Hydrobiologia, Vol. 580, Issue 1, 2007, pp. 23~33.
3 　 Article 234 Ice-covered areas: Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-
discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine 
pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic 
zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such 
areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and 
pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance 
of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation 
and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available 
scientific evidence.
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a valuable framework for the effective management and conservation of the marine 
ecological environment of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. Specifically, it requires 
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea to coordinate their actions and 
cooperate in the conservation and exploitation of the living resources of the sea, 
the protection of the marine environment and the undertaking of joint scientific 
research projects in the area. Other interested States or international organizations 
may only be “invited”, “as appropriate”, to cooperate with the coastal States. This 
vital article reads: 
Article 123 Cooperation of States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas 
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with 
each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties 
under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an 
appropriate regional organization: 
(a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and 
exploitation of the living resources of the sea; 
(b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with 
respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where 
appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area; 
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international 
organizations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this 
article.
Article 123 emphasizes the need of cooperation between States bordering an 
enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, both in exercising their rights and in performing 
their duties under the UNCLOS. But such a provision is directory rather than 
mandatory, since it uses the word “should”, rather than “shall” when it mandates 
the need to cooperate. In addition, when describing the need for these States 
to coordinate in the fields of marine living resources management, marine 
environmental protection and marine scientific research, the UNCLOS adopts 
the phrase of exhortation, “shall endeavour”, rather than the language of strict 
obligation “shall”. The former wording, according to the principles of legal text 
interpretation, means that “to try one’s best” is sufficient, therefore having no 
mandatory nature either. 
Secondly, the provisions of Article 123 concerning cooperation between 
To Build a Peaceful Community in the South China Sea: Concept and Approaches 15
coastal States within a community and other States or international organizations 
beyond the community in furtherance of the provisions of this article imply that: 
(a) the coastal States “shall endeavor” to cooperate with other interested States or 
international organizations, which however is not mandatory; (b) they may do so 
directly or through an appropriate regional organization, such as the ASEAN; (c) 
they shall do so “as appropriate”; (d) other States or international organizations may 
cooperate, only when having been “invited”, with the coastal States in furtherance 
of the provisions of this article; and (e) the “invitee” shall only be the “interested” 
States or international organizations (i.e., stakeholders). 
When the text of Article 123 was discussed at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Turkey and Uruguay, respectively, made 
proposals in the context of determining the breadth of the territorial sea. Both 
proposals require that in an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, where it is impossible 
for coastal States to fix the maximum breadth of their territorial seas, the breadth of 
the territorial seas shall be determined by “agreement” between the littoral States.4 
A proposal by Iraq provides that freedom of navigation should be maintained in 
semi-enclosed seas.5 Yugoslavia also proposed that all ships and aircraft should be 
guaranteed the freedom of navigation and overflight in outlets connecting semi-
enclosed seas with open seas. However, the Yugoslavian proposal does not affect 
the regime of passage through straits used for international navigation.6 In addition 
to the said proposals, many States, during the sessions, also submitted their 
proposals on the norms, rules or standards concerning enclosed or semi-enclosed 
seas. For example, Korea proposed replacing “should” in the first line of the 
opening phrase of the draft by “shall”, thus establishing an obligation. However, 
this proposal was not accepted.7
4  　 A/AC.138/SC.II/L.16, paragraph 2, reproduced in III SBC Report 1973, p. 2 (Turkey); A/
AC.138/SC.II/ L.16/Rev.1, paragraph 2, reproduced in III SBC Report 1973, p. 2 (Turkey); 
A/AC.138/SC.II/L.24, article 2, paragraph 2, reproduced in III SBC Report 1973, pp. 23, 25 
(Uruguay), quoted in Myron H. Nordquist et al. ed., United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. III, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 
357.
5　  A/CONF.62/C.2/L.71 and Add. 1 and 2 (1974), articles 1 to 4, III Off. Rec. 236 (Iraq), 
quoted in Myron H. Nordquist et al. ed., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982: A Commentary, Vol. III, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 358.
6　  Yugoslavia (1976, mimeo.), article 129 bis (RSNT II), reproduced in IV Platzoder 486, 
quoted in Myron H. Nordquist et al. ed., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982: A Commentary, Vol. III, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p 361.
7　   C.2/Informal Meeting/59 (1980, mimeo.), article 123 (Korea), reproduced in V Platzoder 
63, quoted in Myron H. Nordquist et al. ed., United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
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The process of the international legislative conference above and the final 
text of UNCLOS Article 123 tell that, albeit the absence of any mandatory norms, 
coastal States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea like the SCS, the Black 
Sea and the Caribbean Sea, are required (or exactly, “shall endeavour”) to cooperate 
and coordinate their actions, in particular with regards to the matters listed in 
subparagraphs (a) to (c). Such provisions suffice to illustrate that each enclosed 
or semi-enclosed sea constitutes, without any doubt, a community envisioned by 
the UNCLOS. China, a State with the largest population and economic aggregate 
among the SCS littoral States, should naturally be the most important member 
of the SCS community. Unavoidably, wide varieties of problems may arise in 
the process of building the SCS community. Taking these problems into account, 
China should orchestrate, and synchronize the efforts of all SCS littoral States by 
spearheading such efforts and tackling them to achieve the goal of constructing a 
peaceful community in the region.
II. UNCLOS Provisions with Respect to the Three Major 
Spheres of Cooperation
Notably, UNCLOS Article 123 merely prescribes that States bordering a semi-
enclosed sea, like the SCS, shall “cooperate with each other in the exercise of 
their rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention”. “To this 
end”, they “shall endeavor” to coordinate the management of the living resources 
of the sea, the protection of the marine environment and the undertaking of 
marine scientific research. Concrete provisions with regard to these three areas of 
cooperation have to be found in other articles of the UNCLOS. 
A. Provisions Concerning Cooperation in the Sphere of Conservation 
and Management of the Living Resources of the Sea
UNCLOS Article 56(1)(a) stipulates that the coastal State has sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources in the exclusive 
economic zone. This provision is, certainly, an important basic norm regulating 
coastal states bordering a semi-enclosed sea. The provisions of Article 61 on 
Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. III, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 365.
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the conservation of the living resources, including those requiring the coastal 
State to take “proper conservation and management measures” to avoid over-
exploitation, and those demanding the coastal State to cooperate with the competent 
international organization to this end, are regulations that the States neighboring 
the SCS and other semi-enclosed seas shall implement. Article 63 laid down some 
provisions with respect to stocks occurring within the exclusive economic zones 
of two or more coastal States or both within the exclusive economic zone and in 
an area beyond and adjacent to it. Such provisions are even more important to the 
management of living resources in the semi-enclosed SCS.
UNCLOS Articles 117 and 118 require all States to cooperate in the 
conservation and management of the living resources of the high seas. This 
requirement is also likely to be applied to the SCS, because even in this narrow 
semi-enclosed sea, there may still exist a small area beyond the limits of the 
exclusive economic zones of States, to which the rules of the high seas established 
by the 1982 UNCLOS shall be applied.8 
B. Provisions Regarding Cooperation in the Sphere of Marine 
Environment Protection
Article 56, paragraph 1, subparagraph b(iii) of the UNCLOS expressly states 
that in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has jurisdiction with regard 
to the protection of the marine environment. In addition to that, Article 192 sets 
out the general provision that States have the obligation to protect and preserve 
the marine environment. Article 192 should be read in conjunction with Article 
193, which explicitly stipulates that States have the sovereign right to exploit their 
natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with 
their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment. Article 195, in order 
to prevent the transfer of pollution, further provides that: “In taking measures to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment, States shall act so 
as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another 
or transform one type of pollution into another.” This provision is particularly 
meaningful to the States adjacent to an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea. Lastly, 
8   Although the base points and baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea of 
some relevant islands in the SCS are not yet clear, this small area of high seas may possibly 
lie in the broader northern part of the SCS, approximately in the waters off the southern 
coast of the Dongsha Islands. 
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Article 197 clearly mandates that,
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional 
basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in 
formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended 
practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic 
regional features.
This article further requires that States surrounding a semi-enclosed sea like the 
SCS, when building a regional system for marine environmental protection, shall 
cooperate with competent international organizations and take into account the 
characteristic features of the SCS community.
With regard to marine environmental protection, in addition to the UNCLOS, 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Regional Seas Programme 
has also developed a series of marine environmental conventions tailored to the 
special characteristics of the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, 
the greater Caribbean region and other regional seas (mainly semi-enclosed seas). 
Apart from such conventions designed by UNEP, States bordering semi-enclosed 
seas, such as the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, have also drawn up conventions 
within their communities with respect to these semi-enclosed sea areas. 
C. Provisions about Cooperation in the Sphere of Marine Scientific 
Research
UNCLOS Article 56, paragraph 1, subparagraph b(ii) explicitly states that 
in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has jurisdiction with regard to 
marine scientific research. Additionally, Article 87, paragraph 1, subparagraph (f) 
articulates the freedom of marine scientific research on the high seas. Article 245 
provides for the principles that the coastal States shall obey in the exercise of their 
sovereignty over marine scientific research in their territorial waters. Specifically, 
coastal States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, have the exclusive right to 
regulate, authorize and conduct marine scientific research in their territorial sea. 
Marine scientific research therein shall be conducted only with the express consent 
of and under the conditions set forth by the coastal State. Article 246 specifies the 
principles that the coastal States shall follow in the management of marine scientific 
To Build a Peaceful Community in the South China Sea: Concept and Approaches 19
research conducted in their exclusive economic zone and on their continental shelf, 
as well as how to reasonably exercise their right of consent, and how to withhold 
their consent to the conduct of a scientific research project by a foreign State.9
It must be underscored that all the provisions above should be implemented 
under the notion of “peaceful uses”, as proclaimed in paragraph 4 of the preamble 
to the UNCLOS. This paragraph reads:
 
[The States Parties to this Convention] Recognizing the desirability of 
establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all 
9 　Article 246 (Marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone and on the 
continental shelf): 1. Coastal States, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, have the right to 
regulate, authorize and conduct marine scientific research in their exclusive economic zone 
and on their continental shelf in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention. 
2. Marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf 
shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal State. 3. Coastal States shall, in normal 
circumstances, grant their consent for marine scientific research projects by other States 
or competent international organizations in their exclusive economic zone or on their 
continental shelf to be carried out in accordance with this Convention exclusively for 
peaceful purposes and in order to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment 
for the benefit of all mankind. To this end, coastal States shall establish rules and procedures 
ensuring that such consent will not be delayed or denied unreasonably. 4. For the purposes 
of applying paragraph 3, normal circumstances may exist in spite of the absence of 
diplomatic relations between the coastal State and the researching State. 5. Coastal 
States may however in their discretion withhold their consent to the conduct of a marine 
scientific research project of another State or competent international organization in the 
exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of the coastal State if that project: (a) 
is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, whether 
living or non-living; (b) involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives 
or the introduction of harmful substances into the marine environment; (c) involves the 
construction, operation or use of artificial islands, installations and structures referred to in 
articles 60 and 80; (d) contains information communicated pursuant to article 248 regarding 
the nature and objectives of the project which is inaccurate or if the researching State 
or competent international organization has outstanding obligations to the coastal State 
from a prior research project. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, coastal 
States may not exercise their discretion to withhold consent under subparagraph (a) of that 
paragraph in respect of marine scientific research projects to be undertaken in accordance 
with the provisions of this Part on the continental shelf, beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, outside those specific 
areas which coastal States may at any time publicly designate as areas in which exploitation 
or detailed exploratory operations focused on those areas are occurring or will occur within 
a reasonable period of time. Coastal States shall give reasonable notice of the designation of 
such areas, as well as any modifications thereto, but shall not be obliged to give details of 
the operations therein. 7. The provisions of paragraph 6 are without prejudice to the rights 
of coastal States over the continental shelf as established in article 77. 8. Marine scientific 
research activities referred to in this article shall not unjustifiably interfere with activities 
undertaken by coastal States in the exercise of their sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
provided for in this Convention. 
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States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international 
communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, 
the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of 
their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine 
environment….
This wording shows that the spirit of the entire convention is to create a 
peaceful environment for human beings to exploit the marine resources, protect 
the marine environment and undertake relevant scientific research activities. This 
spirit is not only honored in the preamble of the UNCLOS. Actually, the detailed 
provisions of UNCLOS Article 88 (with respect to the high seas), Articles 141, 143, 
147 and 155 (with regards to international seabed area), Articles 240, 242 and 246 
(concerning marine scientific research), all expressly emphasize that everything 
shall be done “for peaceful purposes”. Therefore, the framework designed by 
the UNCLOS for semi-enclosed seas, like the SCS, is founded on the concepts 
of peaceful cooperation and mutual coordination, with a view to maintaining a 
peaceful marine community shared and jointly governed by the neighboring States. 
III. Current Hurdles: Ignorance of or Disrespect for 
History by Some States
International law has provided the legal basis for building peaceful 
communities; nevertheless, the real scenario concerning the building of such a 
community in the SCS has always been grim. This grim scenario is primarily 
caused by some States’ insufficient knowledge of history and historical rights or 
their disrespect for the same, even if they have such knowledge.
China’s sovereignty over the SCS Islands rests on its original title deriving 
from its continuous occupation of these islands as a whole in history. Clear 
accounts of the relevant facts could be found as early as the Eastern Han Dynasty 
(AD 25-220), the era during which the book Yiwu Zhi (Record of Foreign Matters) 
was completed.10 In 1933, France forcibly landed on several islets of China’s Xisha 
10　 Yiwu Zhi (Record of Foreign Matters), a book completed by YANG Fu in the Eastern 
Han Dynasty, recorded the dangers when sailing in the waters adjacent to the Xisha and 
the Nansha Islands, saying that “the waters around Qitou (ancient Chinese designation 
for islands and reefs) in Zhanghai (ancient Chinese designation for South China Sea) are 
shallow and full of magnetic rocks. When ships are sailing in this sea area, it is difficult to 
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and Nansha Islands. Notwithstanding the devastation and chaos caused by the war, 
the Chinese government and people kept protesting against France’s offense and 
negotiating with the French authorities.11 Six years later, Japan annexed some islets 
in the SCS by force in 1939, marking the end of French occupation. And these 
islets were occupied by the Japanese until the end of World War II.12 In contrast to 
these short-lived militarists, the Chinese government and people were the first to 
discover, exploit and manage the SCS Islands, and have administrated these islands 
for thousands of years. Numerous evidences can substantiate this point.13 The 
details will not be explored here, since it is not the subject of this article. 
However, some Western scholars, being ignorant of China’s ancient history, 
presume that China’s sovereignty claims over SCS Islands should be compared 
with the later military occupation by colonialists, such as France and Japan. They 
also falsely claim that those military colonialists, who came to the SCS from 
afar, have clearer evidences of their rights. In the South China Sea Arbitration 
initiated by the Philippines in 2016, the arbitrators surprisingly made the following 
move forward as if they were caught in some magnetic field.” See TANG Zhou, Zhengde 
Qiongtai Zhi (Local Records of Hainan Province in the Reign of Emperor Zhengde), Vol. 9, 
Local Products (II) – Medicines, quoted in Yiwu Zhi, p. 14, a photocopy made by Shanghai 
Ancient Works Bookstore from the aberrant copy of the edition completed in the reign of 
Chinese Ming Emperor Zhengde as collected in Tianyi Pavilion, Ningbo, 1964. See also 
HAN Zhenhua ed., A Compilation of Historical Materials on China’s South China Sea 
Islands, Beijing: Oriental Press, 1988, p. 23. (in Chinese) 
11　 During this period, the Chinese government and people kept protesting against France’s 
offense and negotiating with the French government, which never actually controlled and 
managed these islets in the SCS. In addition, the article “Illes Paracels” by Oliver A. Saix 
(published in the French journal Terre Air Mer, La Geographie, November-December, 
1933), mentioned that in the 1920s, the acting viceroy of Vietnam appointed by the French 
government admitted that “the Xisha Islands, according to various reports, is owned by 
China.” At the same time, a French captain also acknowledged the fact by saying that “up 
to now, Annam (Vietnam) has nothing to do with the Xisha Islands. No coastal fishermen 
or ship-owners go there, and they even do not know the existence of this group of islands.” 
See Hungdah Chiu, An Analysis on the Territorial Sovereignty over the Xisha and the 
Nansha Islands, People and Society, No. 3, 1974, p. 39, footnote 48. (in Chinese) 
12　  In 1939 (the 14th year of the Showa Era), the Office of the Japanese Governor-General of 
Taiwan issued the Governor-General of Taiwan Order No. 31, stating that: “The Shinnan 
Gunto (the new names given by Japan for the Xisha and the Nansha Islands) has been 
incorporated into the territory of Kaohsiung, Taiwan.” The order was republished on the 
official newspaper of the Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan on 18 April 1939, No. 
3683, p. 720. Hungdah Chiu and Choon-ho Park, Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1975, p. 13. 
13　 Kuen-chen FU, A Study on the Legal Status of the South (China) Sea, Taipei: 123 
Information Co., 1995, pp. 47~116 (in Chinese); Kuen-chen FU, Sovereignty Claims over 
the Ocean Resources in the South China Sea, Taipei: Young Lions Publishing Co., 1981, pp. 
77~108 (in Chinese). 
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statement based on the words of the Philippines’ attorneys:14
According to the Philippines, the absence of any Chinese historic rights in the 
South China Sea is also apparent in various historical documents obtained 
by the Tribunal from the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and the Archives 
Nationales d’Outre-Mer and provided to the Parties for comment. In the 
Philippines’ view, these documents confirm that “prior to the Second World 
War France did not consider China to have made a claim in regard to any of 
the Spratlys, or to the waters of the South China Sea far removed from China’s 
mainland coast.”15 
In addition, the arbitrators also said, 
“The post-war documents – including France’s internal records – make clear 
that France retained its claim to those features,” a position the Philippines 
considers consistent with its view that the United Kingdom and United States 
“wished to protect France’s sovereignty claim” in connection with the Cairo 
Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation.16
Ironically, these statements have even been incorporated into the final award 
of the South China Sea Arbitration. It reveals the psyche and mindset of Euro-
centrism of certain Western scholars or politicians: “China cannot be the owner of 
the SCS Islands.” They “wish” that the SCS Islands were the territories of European 
countries like France, the United Kingdom or even Germany; in their minds, the 
fact that the Chinese people have lived here for thousands of years is completely 
ignorable. Disputably, the arbitrators also showed such improper mindsets during 
the adjudication. To their disappointment, however, history has turned out to be 
opposite to their hope. Not only does China have the original sovereignty over the 
SCS Islands due to its first discovery and occupation of these islands as well as 
its continuous exploitation and administration of them for thousands of years, but 
14　 South China Sea Arbitration, Award on Merits, 12 July 2016, para. 198.
15　 South China Sea Arbitration, Written Responses of the Philippines on French Archive 
Materials, 3 June 2016, para. 30. The claims made by the French colonial government over 
the territories of the islands in the Far East, obviously, should not be considered decisive. 
The “facts” alleged by the Philippines merely reflect a unilateral hope of the Philippines. 
16　 South China Sea Arbitration, Written Responses of the Philippines on French Archive 
Materials, 3 June 2016, para. 31.
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it also enjoys the legitimate historic rights under international law to the waters 
adjacent to these features in the SCS. 
The documents of World War II mentioned in the Award, such as the Cairo 
Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation, were far from supporting the French 
colonialists’ intention to continue their enjoyment of sovereignty over the maritime 
features in the SCS. Instead, the negotiation process showed the aspiration of all 
Allied countries to eradicate colonialism after the war. In particular, the United 
States, the leading Allied power of the war at that time, took a very different 
position from the declining British Empire. U.S. President Roosevelt, who had 
negotiated and concluded the Cairo Declaration with British Prime Minister 
Churchill and Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek, met Churchill on the warship 
USS Augusta and discussed whether or not the post-war colonies should exist. 
Roosevelt asserted that the existing world structure was that of the 18th century, 
which was unfair to the people of the colonies and therefore should be changed 
after the war. Churchill, when feeling the shift in leadership, could only shake 
his finger in exasperation and said to Roosevelt: “I believe you are trying to do 
away with the British Empire. Every idea you entertain about the structure of the 
postwar world demonstrates it. But in spite of that, we know that you constitute our 
only hope. And you know that we know that without America, the Empire won’t 
stand.”17 Joseph Stalin, the leader of Soviet Union at that time, clearly expressed 
his opposition to the return of Annam (Vietnam) to France after the war.18
The subsequent history shows that the United Nations (UN), under the push 
of the Allied countries, was established immediately after the end of World War II, 
and “decolonization” was set as a common mission of mankind. Additionally, the 
UN Trusteeship Council was created to lead the old colonies to self-government or 
independence.19 
17　 Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It, New York: Duel Sloane & Pearce, 1946, pp. 36~42.
18　 FU Bingchang, Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, telegraphed to the Republic of 
China government on 11 December 1943, saying that the Soviet leader Stalin fully agreed 
upon the content of the Cairo Declaration. In this telegram FU Bingchang added, the 
Soviet Union had expressed that Annam (Vietnam) should not be handed back to France 
after the war, which was revealed in confidence by Harriman, the U.S. Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union. See the archives of Chinese Taiwan authorities, Daily Record of the Cairo 
Conference, pp. 159~160 (in Chinese), quoted in LIANG Jingchun, Cairo Conference, 4th 
edition, Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1978, p. 156. (in Chinese)
19　 On 1 January 1942, twenty-six anti-Fascist Allies, including the United States, the 
United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union, signed the Declaration by United Nations, 
expressing their common aspiration to establish a new universal international organization. 
Upon the end of the World War II, the United Nations Conference on International 
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In fact, at the summit meeting held in Cairo in 1943, Chinese president Chiang 
Kai-shek also reached an agreement with the British and American leaders over 
the following issues: (a) in due course Korea should become free and independent; 
(2) Vietnam should be independent and should not be under the control of France; 
(3) Ryukyu should be jointly administrated by China and the United States 
temporarily. Unfortunately, since the content of the summit was not recorded, 
only the independence of Korea was partly achieved; neither the promise for the 
independence of Ryukyu nor that of Vietnam was kept. The consequential Ryukyu 
issue and the Vietnam War were tragic misadventures that could have been avoided. 
All countries in the world should draw lessons from such tragedies.20
Virtually, the French government at that time was merely a government-in-
exile. The quote that “the United Kingdom and United States wished to protect 
France’s sovereignty claim” means, at most, that the Allies (including China) 
shared the wish to rebuild an independent France after the war; this quote should 
not be in any way interpreted as their support for France’s colonial rights in 
Vietnam. The so-called “support” for French colonial rights, if any, would probably 
be Churchill’s. A bundle of facts have proven that the United Nations system 
established by the Allied powers after the war has always insisted on abolishing 
colonialism. Even before the end of World War II, the United States and United 
Kingdom had divergent views on colonies and colonialism. Nevertheless, to 
Organization, was held at San Francisco on 25 April 1945. In addition to the five initiators, 
i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, China, the Soviet Union and France, other 
signatories to the Declaration participated in the conference. The attendees included 
more than 280 delegates of 50 nations, and more than 1,700 advisors, observers, and 
representatives of the media. Notably, the Chinese delegation consisted of ten members. After 
over two months of discussion, those delegates drafted the Charter of the United Nations 
on the basis of the proposals worked out at Dumbarton Oaks. The Charter was unanimously 
adopted by the delegates of the 50 nations on June 25, and was signed by them on the 
following day. In accordance with the procedures agreed at the conference, DONG Biwu, 
the Chinese delegate, had the honor of signing first. Poland, which was not represented at 
the Conference, signed the Charter later and became one of the original 51 Member States. 
The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter 
became effective after being ratified by the United States, the United Kingdom, China, the 
Soviet Union, France, and by a majority of other signatories. According to the Charter, 
the purposes of the United Nations are “to maintain international peace and security”, “to 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples” and “to achieve international co-operation”. All these 
purposes have embodied the common aspiration of all States to “completely eradicate 
colonialism”. 
20　 LIANG Jingchun, Cairo Conference, 4th edition, Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1978, 
pp. 157~159. (in Chinese)
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abandon the colonial system of the 18th century, to help the peoples of the non-
self-governing colonies achieve independence and freely decide their own future, 
and to create a fair and free international trading system have become the common 
aspirations of all the peoples in the world. Undoubtedly, the system created on the 
basis of such concepts has, in the end, become the international system accepted 
universally. Those who are still pursuing the rights of colonists should get a clear 
picture of the development of international law, and renounce their desire to be 
enemies with the people of the world. 
It is also worth noting that the UK and the US, based on their own interests, 
had divergent opinions on the handling of the China Theater following the end of 
World War II. While discussing such issues, they failed to fully consult with the 
Chinese leaders.21 The disagreement between the UK and the US on the China 
Theater during the Cairo and Tehran Conferences held at the end of the war, 
according to a research report on American military history, deeply affected the 
post-war situation in the Far East.22 This historical factor has had a long-term and 
negative impact on regional peace and stability, since it is still rendering murky, 
international legal position on some issues in the Far East, such as the status of 
21　 In fact, the Cairo Conference was held when China had been fighting against Japan for six 
years and the US and the UK had yet to agree on a strategy to deal with Japan. Close to that 
time, the China Theater was deeply affected by the U.S. “Europe-first” strategy, according 
to which the preponderance of the resources would be used to subdue Germany in Europe 
first and fewer to fight against Japan in Asia. Consequently, according to General Marshall’s 
Report, China had received, by the end of World War II, the least amount of supplies leased 
by the US to other countries, accounting only 5 percent of the total amount; moreover, such 
rare supplies were often diverted for other purposes. In addition, the commander of the 
Allied forces in the China war zone did not participate in the discussion on what strategy the 
Allies should use to defeat Japan. British leader Churchill was preoccupied with the thought 
of defending the colonial interests of the British Empire in the Far East. The supplies for 
Chinese troops, when arriving in Rangoon, were robbed by their British counterpart. A 
coalition of Chinese and British forces fought against the Japanese troops in Panmana in 
Myanmar, with the Chinese army facing the front of the enemy forces and British troops 
on the right flank. The latter, however, quietly retreated at the climax of the battle, causing 
heavy casualties to the Chinese army. During the Battle of Yenangyaung, China dispatched 
its forces to the rescue of more than 7,000 British soldiers encircled by the Japanese 
troops. However, due to this dispatch, the battlefield was taken from the Chinese troops 
by their enemies. The US and the UK have, so far, made little public statement on China’s 
contributions and sacrifice during the World War II, which implies their guilty conscience. 
See LIANG Jingchun, Cairo Conference, 4th edition, Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 
1978, pp. 12~14 (in Chinese). History of Anti-Japanese War, p. 249, and Kuomintang 
Archives, Chinese Expeditionary Forces in Burma (I), pp. 4~5, quoted in LIANG Jingchun, 
Cairo Conference, 4th edition, Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1978, p. 33. (in Chinese) 
22　 Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-44, Appendix B, quoted in LIANG Jingchun, 
Cairo Conference, 4th edition, Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1978, p. 40. (in Chinese)
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Ryukyu, the disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and the sovereignty disputes over 
some features in the SCS. East Asian countries bordering the SCS that were once 
under the unequal colonial rule of Western countries, including China, Vietnam and 
the Philippines, in particular, should learn and draw lessons from these historical 
facts. If we, the SCS littoral States, want a long-term peaceful environment for 
development, we obviously cannot rely on the decisions of major powers outside 
the region; instead, we should depend on the goodwill and cooperation of the SCS 
community members. 
At present, although the UNCLOS has laid down a clear legal framework for 
the SCS community, the goodwill and cooperation of the community members 
are still insufficient. Such insufficiencies constitute an obstacle to the building of a 
peaceful community in the SCS. 
In fact, the Philippines and Vietnam are well aware of China’s territorial claims 
in the SCS based on its occupation of the relevant islands and reefs. In 1945, China 
recovered the Xisha and the Nansha Islands in the SCS; and in 1947 it officially 
drew the U-shaped line in the SCS, defining the limit of China’s claim to the waters 
in the region. Neither the Philippines nor Vietnam, the two countries currently 
controlling several features of the Nansha Islands, had raised any objection 
against China’s conducts at that time. However, ridiculously, the Philippines’ 
Cloma brothers alleged, in 1956, to have “discovered” the “terra nullius” of the 
Nansha Islands. This absurd claim has been long refuted by Chinese and foreign 
scholars and experts.23 The diplomatic note sent by Pham Van Dong, Premier of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to his Chinese counterpart ZHOU Enlai in 
1958 is, actually, in a better position to tell the truth about that part of history. On 4 
September 1958, the Chinese government issued the Declaration of the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea, stating that the breadth 
of China’s territorial waters shall be 12 nautical miles and the method of straight 
baselines shall be applied to draw its territorial waters. The Declaration also made 
it clear that the said provision shall also apply to the Xisha Islands, the Nansha 
23　 Hungdah Chiu and Choon-ho Park, Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, Ocean 
Development and International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1975, p. 9; Chorography of China’s 
South China Sea Islands, 30 June 1975, p. 13; Patrol of the Waters Adjacent to the Nansha 
Islands by Chinese Navy, Taipei: Taiwan Student Press, June 1984, pp. 85~89; Report on 
the Handling of the Cloma Incident, October 1956, in Kuen-chen FU, LIU Li and JING 
Xiaojie eds., Exhibition of Historical Materials on Chinese Southern Territory Held by 
Taiwan Authorities, Xiamen: Xiamen University South China Sea Institute, 1 March 2015. 
(in Chinese) 
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Islands and other islands belonging to China.24 On 14 September of the same year, 
Pham Van Dong sent a diplomatic note to his Chinese counterpart ZHOU Enlai, 
stating that “the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam recognizes 
and supports the Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
on its decision concerning China’s territorial sea made on 4 September 1958 and 
the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam respects this decision”.25
IV. An Uneven Path: From the Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea to the Code of 
Conduct in the South China Sea
The chaotic situation in the SCS, especially in the Nansha Islands with some 
component features having been illegally occupied by the Philippines, Vietnam 
and Malaysia respectively, is still difficult to resolve at the moment. This chaos is 
not primarily caused by unclear legal provisions, but by some States within and 
beyond the region that disrespect history and law. Thanks to China’s adherence to 
the path of peaceful development, no major wars have been waged in the SCS so 
far. With China’s continuous efforts for many years, the States bordering the SCS 
signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 
Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia on 4 November 2002, with a view to stopping 
the disorderly occupation of features and predatory exploitation of resources in 
this very community. China and Vietnam, in 2004, also delineated their maritime 
boundaries in the Beibu Gulf, northwestern SCS. However, a party of scholars 
and officials from certain SCS littoral States, instigated by Western scholars, still 
assume that the DOC is not a treaty and therefore has no binding force. Some 
littoral States even attempted, from time to time, to continue the private exploitation 
of oil and gas resources in the region by avoiding the DOC, with no intention to 
return the features they illegally occupied to China. Under such circumstances, 
while adhering to the DOC, China is also willing to work with other member States 
of the SCS community, to develop, in line with the plan envisioned in Article 10 
of the DOC, a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) with full normative 
24　 Hungdah Chiu and Choon-ho Park, Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, Ocean 
Development and International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1975, p. 15, footnote 80.
25　 On 30 January 1980, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China published a document titled 
“China’s Indisputable Sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands”, Ta Kung Pao, 31 
January 1980. (in Chinese) 
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force, seeking to build a long-term peaceful community in the region at an early 
date.26
How can negotiations be concluded successfully on the COC so as to create 
“another” treaty with binding force? To this question, Chinese Foreign Minister 
WANG Yi, on 5 August 2013, highlighted four key points before journalists:27
1. We should hold reasonable expectations for the negotiations over the COC. 
Such critical negotiations cannot be completed overnight.
2. A consensus should be reached through negotiations. This is also an 
agreement reached upon the conclusion of the DOC in 2002. In order to achieve a 
successful implementation of the COC in the future, the code needs to be concluded 
by consensus at the very beginning. 
3. We should eliminate interference and disturbance from non-parties. All 
parties to the DOC should work together towards this end. We must avoid any 
interference from States beyond the region. 
4. We should proceed step by step. The existing DOC cannot be replaced by 
the COC. That is to say, the parties are not going to abandon the original DOC to 
create a completely new thing. Contrarily, the COC should be established on the 
basis of the DOC.
China and ASEAN member States drafted a framework for the COC in 2017. 
Details of the framework have not been released yet, which indicates obviously 
that the States concerned still held reservations about the final content. The author 
asserts that the four basic principles put forward by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi, especially the third and fourth ones, should be unanimously recognized by the 
States neighboring the SCS. This consensus should be the cornerstone for building 
a peaceful community in the SCS in the future, since it shows the basic respect for 
international treaty law, and it is also the basis for the community members to build 
a win-win mentality through mutual trust. 
V. Efforts to Make Within and Beyond the Community
26　Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, Article 10: The Parties 
concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would 
further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of 
consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.
27　 At http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-08-05/133327867046.shtml, 9 November 2018. (in 
Chinese)
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In conclusion, given the current imperfect situation, how should we cooperate 
to foster the construction of the concept of SCS community? How do we create a 
peaceful, collaborative, harmonious and forward-looking SCS community? The 
author asserts that education and publicity efforts in this regard should be started 
from both inside and outside the community: 
For the States bordering the SCS, the priorities should be as follows: 
a. Work together to promote national equality and peaceful coexistence, and 
resolutely move away from the old mentality of eurocentrism;
b. Promote the building of a peaceful community in the semi-enclosed sea of 
the SCS, based on UNCLOS, and encourage the spirit of community service in the 
region; 
c. Value the history of this community and its peace-loving cultural traditions;
d. Promote the rule of law in the international community, respect the 
“due course” of international law, and refrain from sacrificing the idealism of 
international law for the sake of short-term practical interests; and
e. Start cooperation from programs with low sensitivity in the SCS 
community, such as joint enforcement of fishing moratorium and fishing restriction, 
and cooperation on conserving the environment and ecology, strengthening the 
construction of navigation safety facilities and on emergency search and rescue.
For the stakeholders beyond the region, their priorities should be as follows:
a. Respect the ability of the SCS littoral States to resolve the disputes in their 
own community and stop interfering with their affairs, if not invited; 
b. Understand and respect the long history and peace-loving traditions of all 
the peoples living around the SCS with an open mind;
c. Faithfully abide by the UNCLOS provisions on semi-enclosed sea 
communities and stop meddling, improperly, in the internal affairs of these 
communities; and
d. Recognize and respect the fact that peace and freedom of navigation have 
been maintained in the SCS for thousands of years, and stop spreading rumors 
and creating disturbances in the region, and intervening in the affairs of the SCS 
community under the pretext of safeguarding freedom of navigation. 
Translator: XIE Hongyue
Editor (English): Godfred Sowah Khartey
